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COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL 
 
On turning 50, a friend of mine said: “you can’t pretend you are young anymore.” 
 
INTRODUCTION 
As the Civil Rights Act turns fifty, antidiscrimination law has become unfashionable.  
For those commentators and reformers who concern themselves with addressing racial, ethnic, 
and gender disparities, antidiscrimination law occupies a less central role than it did fifty years 
ago, perhaps even a marginal one. The core problem, it seems, is that discrimination is a limited 
explanation for current forms of contemporary inequality. Discussing race, economist Glenn 
Loury has argued that discrimination should be “demoted, dislodged from its current prominent 
place in the conceptual discourse on racial inequality in American life.”
1
 Richard Ford and 
Richard Banks offer a similar assessment, arguing that if “we are legitimately concerned about 
substantive disparities” then the “goal of eliminating discrimination is too modest, not ambitious 
enough.”
2
 It is not uncommon to speak of remedying discrimination as separate from a larger 
goal of addressing inequality. And civil rights strategies are posited as not up to the serious task 
of improving mobility for low-wage workers or providing access into entry-level employment. 
The antidiscrimination approach, it is said, is “based on the principle of freedom of individual 
opportunity” which necessarily helps the more advantaged and better-trained, and is thus 
inadequate for reducing substantive inequality in our society.
3
 If one is seeking innovations to 
address poverty and inequality or to promote economic and social opportunity, much 
commentary suggests that antidiscrimination law is not the place to find them.  
 It is not hard to harness reasons to demote “discrimination” in contemporary inequality 
discourse. Discrimination remains prevalent in our society, and continues to explain extant 
disparities between groups.
4
 However, there is much to suggest that addressing contemporary 
inequities requires confronting the full range of mechanisms that disparately affect racial and 
                                                 
1
 GLENN C. LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY 92-93 (2002). 
2
 Ralph Richard Banks & Richard Thompson Ford, (How) Does Unconscious Bias Matter?: Law, 
Politics, and Racial Inequality, 58 EMORY L.J. 1053, 1120 (2009).  
3
 WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN POOR 196 
(1996). 
4
 See, e.g., Roland G. Fryer et al., Racial Disparities in Job Finding and Offered Wages, 56 J.L. & ECON, 
633, 635-36 (2011) (study finding that racial discrimination in offered wages accounted for at least one 
third of the black-white wage gap); Devah Pager et al., Discrimination in a Low-Wage Labor Market: A 
Field Experiment, 74 AMER. SOC. REV. 777. 792-93 (2009) (study of white, black, and Latino applicants 
seeking entry-level jobs in the low-wage labor market in New York City finding that blacks were half as 
likely to receive callbacks or job offers as were equally qualified whites, and that black and Latino 
applicants without a criminal record were treated no better than a white applicant just released from 
prison). See also KEVIN STAINBACK & DONALD TOMASKOVIC-DEVEY, DOCUMENTING DESEGREGATION: 
RACIAL AND GENDER SEGREGATION IN PRIVATE-SECTOR EMPLOYMENT SINCE THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 
(2013). 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2409090 
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ethnic minorities and women, including improving education and training of minority workers,
5
 
the decreasing fortune of less skilled workers,
6
 the effects of immigration status on social 
mobility, and how geography and place structures opportunity.
7
 Given the complex reasons for 
contemporary inequality social reform is less likely to center merely on questions of 
individualized bias, but on social welfare and education programs, interventions to improve the 
economic status of unskilled and semi-skilled workers, and strategies to diminish spatial 
segregation and improve the conditions facing communities of concentrated poverty. 
Contemporary advocates might now organize their work around narratives of social inclusion,
8
 
or addressing spatial inequities in the distribution of opportunity.
9
  
Yet there is a danger in casting aside the Civil Rights Act as one charts this new course. 
For one, as I discuss in Part I, such a move misunderstands the force of the antidiscrimination 
directive that undergirded Act, one not limited to formal discrimination or bias and which drew 
on a broad set of private and public implementation tools to respond to evolving problems of 
exclusion. Reminding ourselves of the implementation strategies that emerged in the first decade 
after the Act, produces a richer account of what we mean by “discrimination” and attunes us to a 
broader set of implementation tools than is conventionally associated with antidiscrimination 
law. Second, as I show in Part II, the Civil Rights Act continues to sustain an important set of 
strategies to promote inclusion. In that Part, I discuss the emergence of strategies to address 
contemporary disparities under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, as well as emerging efforts 
under Title VII – reminiscent of Title VII’s early years – to make Title VII more responsive to 
contemporary forces shaping exclusion in labor markets. 
Part III concludes with the value of retaining hold of this civil rights infrastructure, even 
as reformers develop other tools and strategies for promoting equity and inclusion. My argument 
here is that the Act provides an important regulatory framework for addressing problems of 
exclusion facing a broad range of groups (including women and racial and ethnic minorities), 
across a range of domains (education, employment, transportation, environment, agriculture and 
more) and using a range of potentially powerful public and private enforcement strategies. 
Transformative statutes do not come to us every day. For pragmatic as well as expressive 
reasons, it is worth continuing to consider what one might wrest from the Act’s great aspiration 
and powerful design. 
 
                                                 
5
See Roland Fryer, The Declining Significance of Discrimination, at 30-31 (2010), available at 
http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/fryer/files/racial_inequality_in_the_21st_century_the_declining_significan
ce_of_discrimination.pdf. (urging educational intervention to address the skills gap). 
6
 See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 3. 
7
 See PATRICK SHARKEY, STUCK IN PLACE: URBAN NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE END OF PROGRESS 
TOWARD RACIAL EQUALITY 67 (2013). 
8
See, e.g., Center for Social Inclusion, http://www.centerforsocialinclusion.org/ (last visited Jan. 29, 
2014). 
9
 See, e.g., INST. FOR METRO. OPPORTUNITY, http://www.law.umn.edu/metro/index.html (last visited Jan. 
29, 2014); POVERTY & RACE RESEARCH ACTION COUNCIL, www.prrac.org (last visited Jan. 29, 2014); 
Understanding Opportunity Mapping, KIRWAN INST., http://kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/opportunity-
communities/mapping/understanding-opportunity-mapping/; THE OPPORTUNITY AGENDA, 
www.opportunityagenda.org. 
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I. REVISITING AMBITION 
Antidiscrimination is at the core of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. While the Act uses a 
range of terms –Title VI of the Act provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the 
ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits 
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance
”10
 and Title VII prohibits discrimination, as well as segregation and classification in 
ways that deprive employees of opportunities
11
 – our collective shorthand for the Act is that it 
prohibits “discrimination.” 
Among those concerned with addressing contemporary race, ethnic, or gender disparities 
or with promoting economic inclusion, the antidiscrimination approach typified by the Act is 
often framed as inadequate.
12
 In part, this assessment stems from a determination that 
discrimination is either in significant decline, or a fairly marginal explanation of contemporary 
disparities.
13
 In part, this assessment also represents a critique of the strategies underlying civil 
rights law: the antidiscrimination approach is seen as intertwined with an emphasis on litigation 
at the expense of other approaches.
14
 The thrust of these critiques is that the antidiscrimination 
idea centers on formal, market discrimination and bias, and is thus not sufficiently robust to be 
relevant today. 
However, I urge caution in characterizing the 1964 Act as centered on formal or explicit 
discrimination. Rather, one can fairly characterize the Act’s regime as seeking to address a range 
of institutional practices that disadvantaged blacks (the main target at the Act’s inception). By 
“regime” I mean to emphasize both the Act as apparently contemplated by its initial drafters and 
legislative and executive proponents, but even more by the private and public enforcement 
structure that emerged in the years after its enactment. 
                                                 
10
 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. 
11
 Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge an individual, or 
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin[.]” 42 
U.S.C. §2000e-2(a). The Act also makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer “to limit, 
segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or 
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an 
employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Id.  
12
 See Banks & Ford, supra note 2, at 1113-14 (contending that “many decisions and practices that 
adversely affect racial minorities do not fit neatly within the conventional antidiscrimination 
framework”); Glenn C. Loury, Discrimination in the Post-Civil Rights Era: Beyond Market Interactions, 
12 J. ECON. PERSP. 117 (1998) (arguing that “market discrimination is only one small part of” 
contemporary racial disparities). And this argument is not new. When the Civil Rights Act was not yet 25 
years old, Derek Bell decried the insufficiency of antidiscrimination law in addressing ongoing “race-
related disadvantages,” noting that “[t]he harvest is past, the summer is ended, and we are not saved.” 
DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 5 (1987). 
13
 See, e.g., Banks & Ford, supra note 2, at 1113 (doubting that racial bias “explains all or even most of 
the racial injustices that plague our society”); LOURY, supra note 1, at 160 (arguing in the context of 
racial inequality that thinking simply in terms of “discrimination” obscures the “causal feedback loops 
that can perpetuate racial inequality from one generation to the next”). 
14
 See, e.g., RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, RIGHTS GONE WRONG: HOW LAW CORRUPTS THE STRUGGLE 
FOR EQUALITY 11-14 (2011).  
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The statutory history – which has been much pored over in the half a century following 
passage of the Act – shows the breadth of the Act’s goals. In finally announcing support for civil 
rights legislation in employment and education, President Kennedy promoted such efforts as 
necessary to ensure full equality in American society and participation in economic life.
15
 In his 
address on the floor of the U.S. House of Representatives introducing the legislation, Kennedy 
cast fair employment laws as part of a quest to end racial disparities in unemployment, en route 
to the larger goal of assuring full employment for all workers.
16
 Introducing Title VI which 
prohibited discrimination in federally funded programs, Kennedy expansively defined the 
antidiscrimination idea underlying the legislation, declaring that: “[S]imple justice requires that 
public funds, to which all taxpayers of all races contribute, not be spent in any fashion which 
encourages, entrenches, subsidizes, or results in racial discrimination.”
17
 “Indirect 
discrimination” through subsidization, Kennedy emphasized, is “invidious” discrimination.
18
 
Legislative history from the House and Senate speaks to the goals of this new 
legislation.
19
 The House Report to one of the bills that would culminate in the Civil Rights Act 
declared that discrimination is an “urgent and most serious national problem” requiring extensive 
action to eradicate exclusion in voting, public accommodation, federal financial assistance, and 
employment.
20
 Recognizing that states had initiated important civil rights legislation, the House 
Report nevertheless recognized the need for national action: “in the last decade it has become 
increasingly clear that progress has been too slow and that national legislation is required to meet 
a national need.”
21
 In addition, the legislature identified goals that went beyond market 
discrimination emphasizing that discrimination was not limited to explicit exclusionary actions, 
but “ranges in degrees from patent absolute rejection to more subtle forms of invidious 
distinctions.”
22
 As an example, this House Report alluded to the effect of seemingly racially 
neutral practices such as “last hired, first fired” and to the relegation of minorities “to 
‘traditional’ positions and through discriminatory promotion practices.”
23
 Occupational 
segregation was achieved through “traditional expectations” as well as the segregation of 
minorities in “involuntary part-time work.”
24
 Discrimination could be subtle: the House Report 
noted that while employment agencies often engaged in “outright refusal to deal with minority 
group applications,” as prevalent was the refusal to refer minorities due to “expressed 
agreements, tacit understandings, and assumptions based on traditional practices.”
25
 In this 
                                                 
15
 See Civil Rights and Job Opportunities, 109 Cong. Rec. 11,175 (1963) (statement of John F. Kennedy, 
President of the United States). 
16
 See id. 
17




 See H.R. REP. NO. 570 (1963). This report accompanies the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 
1963, the “nominal” ancestor to Title VII. H.R. 405, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). See Francis J. Vaas, 
Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 431, 433 n.10 (1966). 
20
 H.R. No. 814 (to accompany H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), at 2 (citing evidence from 
hearing making it “abundantly clear that job opportunity discrimination permeates the national social 






 Id. at 3. 
24
 Id. at 3. 
25
 Id. 
JOHNSON, LEVERAGING ANTIDISCRIMINATION 
DRAFT: PLEASE DO NOT CITE OR CIRCULATE WITHOUT PERMISSION. 
5 
 
congressional history, labor and entry-level jobs emerge as a particular point of focus. The House 
Report refers to efforts to improve opportunities in construction unions, and ensure access to 
apprenticeship training programs often run by labor unions because of the crucial role these 
pathways played in “improving the skills, knowledge and capability of” workers.
26
 
To be sure, key portions of the legislative history of the Act reveal legislative concerns 
about avoiding race-conscious action or intrusions into the “prerogatives” of management 
(prefiguring subsequent debates in Title VII over the extent to which the Act should be 
interpreted to allow disparate impact or affirmative action
27
). And forces aligned against the Act 
sought to minimize administrative power to implement Title VII, most notably succeeding in 
diminishing the powers of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
28
 Yet, this journey 
into the statutory history is meant to check modern characterizations of the antidiscrimination 
goal as aimed at simply removing explicit or blatant barriers or disconnected from the goal of 
economic opportunity. Instead, the legislative history offers a more richly conceived notion of 
the degree to which discrimination was embedded in employment and credentialing institutions 
such as unions, the range of explicit and implicit barriers to inclusion, and the connection 
between the antidiscrimination method and achieving fuller economic participation. 
The ambition of the Act is further revealed when we consider the Act’s implementation 
context – the strategies that public and private actors undertook to implement and enforce the 
Act. Implementation would come to include strategies to: (1) define the Act broadly to reach 
more than intentional discrimination; (2) leveraging administrative and private resources for 
systemic enforcement; and (3) requiring regulated actors to take affirmative inclusionary steps. 
The move beyond intentional discrimination is seen most sharply in the public and 
private implementation of the Act to reach actions with an unjustified disparate impact. Within 
the year after passage of the Act, federal agencies charged with implementing Title VI of the Act 
interpreted the provision to reach not just actions by funding recipients that were intentional, but 




 See, e.g., United Steel Workers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (holding that Title VII 
permitted voluntary race-conscious affirmative action plan over dissent’s claim that the language and 
legislative history of the Act did not permit “quotas” or racial “preference[s]”); Johnson v. Transportation 
Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 670 (1987) (extending Weber to gender-based affirmative action and rejecting 
dissent’s argument that Weber “rewrote the statute it purported to construe”). 
28
 Civil rights reformers had advocated for a strong fair employment agency akin to the National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB) with power to enforce antidiscrimination laws through a cease-and-desist 
power. Instead, legislative compromises meant an EEOC with limited power – charged only with the 
power to investigate claims and mediate disputes. See Francis J. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 
B.C. L. REV. 431, 453 (1966) (detailing Title VII legislative proposals for strong enforcement agency); 
Robert C. Lieberman, Private Power and American Bureaucracy: The EEOC and Civil Rights 
Enforcement 1-2 (Colum. Univ. Dep’t of Political Science, Working Paper, 2010) available at 
http://web1.millercenter.org/apd/colloquia/pdf/col_2005_0318_lieberman.pdf (“As originally conceived 
by civil rights advocates, the EEOC was to have full regulatory powers, particularly the power to issue 
binding cease-and-desist orders to employers.”). Until 1972, the EEOC even lacked power to sue private 
employers in its own name. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 
(1972). 
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those that had the “effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination.”
29
 (Notably these 
regulations were drafted by the agencies, with the involvement of private actors and the White 
House, and formally approved by the President.) What we now understand as the disparate 
impact standard in employment grew in part out of the guidelines issued by the EEOC on 
employment tests, in response to the adoption by southern employers of formally race-neutral 
practices that operated to discriminate.
30
 Two years after passage of the Act, the EEOC issued 
guidance instructing employers to administer an occupational test only where it “fairly measures 
the knowledge or skills required by the particular job or class of job.”
31
 A few years later, the 
EEOC issued additional guidelines requiring that employers using tests have “available ‘data 
demonstrating that the test is predictive of or significantly correlated with important elements of 
work behavior which comprise or are relevant to the job or jobs for which candidates are being 
evaluated.’”
32
 It was in giving “substantial deference” to the EEOC in Griggs v. Duke Power that 
the Supreme Court allowed that the Act prohibited in some cases employers’ facially neutral 
practices that, in fact are “discriminatory in operation.” 
33
 
 Commentators have debated whether the EEOC’s move interpreting the Act to reach 
disparate impact claims was distorting the meaning of a statute centered on disparate treatment 
and colorblindness, or whether this move was supported by the language and prevailing 
                                                 
29
 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2) (1965) (“a recipient . . . may not directly or through contractual or other 
arrangements, utilize criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals 
to discrimination because of their race, color, or national origin, or have the effect of defeating or 
substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the program as respect individuals race, 
color, or national origin.”) (emphasis added). These regulations were created by a task force consisting of 
the White House, the Civil Rights Commission, the Justice Department and the Bureau of the Budget. See 
Comment, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 – Implementation and Impact, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
824 (1968). Each agency drafted a rule, submitted it to the Department of Justice, which then participated 
in the task force to draft these rules. Id. The task force first developed regulations for HEW which then 
became the model for other federal agencies. Id  
30
 See HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL 
POLICY 1960-1972 (1991); Alfred W. Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and 
the Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REV. 59 (1972) (stating that during the one-year 
delay in enforcing the 1964 Civil Rights Act instead of pursuing voluntary compliance with the Act, 
many southern employers “adopted seemingly neutral personnel policies, which, in fact, perpetuated the 
subordinate position of black workers” including tests and educational requirements) (footnote omitted). 
31
  Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424, 433 n.9 (quoting and construing Equal Opportunity Commission 
(EOC) Guidelines on Employment Testing Procedures (Aug. 24, 1966)). 
32
 Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1970); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 433 n.9 
(1971) (relying on 1970 guidelines). 
33
 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431. 
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understandings of “discrimination.” 
34
 Regardless of the position one takes on fidelity to the 
language or the original legislative deal, the point here is that these early moves by the EEOC 
implement the Act in ways that reached beyond thin notions of formal discrimination. Instead, 
the meaning of antidiscrimination emerges in response to the efforts to address the evolving 
barriers facing workers. 
Second, public and private enforcement strategies focused on opening up large scale 
institutions to black workers by targeting salient industries and leveraging systemic tools such as 
regulatory guidance, investigations and hearings, and using litigation mechanisms such as the 
class action device and pattern and practice authority. As other commentators have shown, the 
EEOC adopted structurally oriented strategies –– interpreting language in Title VII to permit it to 
collect data on the racial composition of employers;
 35
 using this data to systemically publicize 
and investigate problems of labor market discrimination in particular regions, sectors and 
industries.
36
 Private enforcement also followed a systemic approach that targeted particular 
                                                 
34
 Compare PAUL D. MORENO, FROM DIRECT ACTION TO AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: FAIR EMPLOYMENT 
LAW AND POLICY IN AMERICA 1933-1972 1-2 (1999) (introducing “disparate impact” as a deviation from 
the “unequal treatment” colorblindness mandate that undergirded civil rights laws) and JOHN DAVID 
SKRENTNY, THE IRONIES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: POLITICS, CULTURE & JUSTICE IN AMERICA 120-21, 
127-131(1996) (describing developments such a racial reporting and disparate impact as moving away 
from the “color-blind approach” of Title VII which focused on the intent of the discriminator), with Susan 
D. Carle, A Social Movement History of Title VII Disparate Impact Analysis, 63 FLA. L. REV. 251, 294-97 
(2011) (describing how disparate impact standards drew on existing theories of discrimination evident in 
the practices of state fair employment commissions) and George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under 
Title VII: An Objective Theory of Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REV. 1297, 1306-07 (1987) (describing 
disparate impact as an appropriate common law gap filling given the absence of a definition of 
“discrimination” in the statute). 
35
 See 42 U.S.C. §2000e-8(c); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1602.7-1602.14. The EEOC developed what are known now 
as the EEO-1 Form (the Employer Information Reports form) which requires certain employers to collect 
and report data on their employees’ race, ethnicity, and sex.  
36
 See Alfred W. Blumrosen, Administrative Creativity: The First Year of the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 694, 711-20 (1970). As sociologist John Sktrentny has 
observed, the EEO-1 Forms allowed EEOC administrators to move beyond an individual approach: “the 
administrators could sit back and look at entire industries or geographic areas, and see racial differences 
not just freely contracting, abstract individuals.” SKRENTNY, supra note 34, at 131. The EEOC used this 
data to develop “conciliation” plans that required employers to adopt particular hiring practices and 
affirmative remedies, and to hold forums that brought public attention to the employment practices of 
major industries. See Robert C. Lieberman, Private Power and American Bureaucracy: The EEOC and 
Civil Rights Enforcement 27-28 (Colum. Univ. Dep’t. of Political Science, Working Paper, 2010) (relying 
on EEOC research report outlining potential use of EEO-1 data to file “commissioner charges” of 
discrimination – which did not require a specific plaintiff’s coming forward—and to develop “technical 
assistance” programs to work with employers with discriminatory practices); see SKRENTNY, supra note 
34, at 132 (describing forum on hiring practices for the textile industry in the Carolinas which included 
forty witnesses representing management, labor, government and private industries); see id. (noting 
forums on white-collar employment and the pharmaceutical industry). 
JOHNSON, LEVERAGING ANTIDISCRIMINATION 





 employed the class-action device,
38
 and that sought to take aim at a range of 





 As former NAACP Legal Defense Fund (LDF) attorney 
Robert Belton has explained: “by 1965 overt discrimination on the basis of race was not 
fashionable.”
41
 Instead, LDF harnessed an approach to challenge “superficially neutral practices, 
such as testing and educational devices or seniority systems that appeared facially neutral or 
color-blind but operated to perpetuate the effects of past discrimination[]”
42
 and “systemic 




Third, the enforcement agency used its regulatory power to promote goals apart from the 
litigation context. While the EEOC (designed to be a weak enforcement agency) lacked (and still 
lacks) power to issue binding substantive regulations to enforce Title VII,
44
 the agency 
developed guidelines on how to avoid discriminatory practices such as seniority systems, and 
most famously on the use of occupational tests. Robert Lieberman has described these guidelines 
as emerging out of the EEOC’s investigation and conciliation power – an attempt by the EEOC 
to provide a guide for “employers and employees about what practices the commission would 
find acceptable and unacceptable in probable cause determinations.”
45
 
This implementation context reveals a robust conception of the antidiscrimination 
directive at the core of the Act – one that reaches beyond explicit practices to reach subtle, 
embedded mechanisms that excluded or inhibited opportunities for black workers.
 
In addition 
this review of the implementation context makes clear that reformers employed a range of 
strategies to move the Act beyond the redress of individual claims. This is manifest in the 
leveraging of federal contracting and spending power, the requirement of affirmative 
inclusionary strategies, the reliance on administrative investigations and regulatory guidance, the 
use of the class-action device, and the attempt to connect the work of private litigators and 
                                                 
37
 LDF and other civil rights and labor activists early on targeted particular industries in the South, 
including the textile industry, the paper industry, and the steel industry that were large sources of non-
farm employment and provided more lucrative wages than many blacks were then earning. See id. See 
also NANCY MACLEAN, FREEDOM IS NOT ENOUGH: THE OPENING OF THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE 79 
(2008) (detailing that the NAACP and the EEOC targeted textile mills because they were the largest non-
farm employer of workers with limited education and supplied “more than half of all industrial jobs in the 
Carolinas and Georgia” and explaining that these jobs though hard, paid higher wages than what was 
available to most black men and women at the time).  
38
 See Robert Belton, A Comparative Review of Public and Private Enforcement of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 31 VAND. L. REV. 905, 930 (1978). The late Professor Robert Belton served as an 
attorney at the NAACP LDF during this period. Id. 
39
 See id. at 936-38 (detailing LDF’s litigation efforts in Griggs). 
40
 See id. at 945-46 (describing litigation culminating in Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th 
Cir. 1971)).  
41




 See id. at 928. 
44
See 42 U.S.C. §2000e-1 (directing EEOC to issue “suitable procedural regulations to carry out the 
provisions of this subchapter”).  
45
 Lieberman, supra note 36, at 28. 
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community-based organizations. Finally, this context reveals that antidiscrimination strategies 
would be cognizant of the realities of the industrial economy at that time and connected to core 
questions of social and economic equality. For instance, the paradigm beneficiary of Title VII 
was the blue-collar worker, evident in reformers’ focus on manufacturing and construction 
industries and on organized labor. In its goals and implementation, the Act centered on opening 
up access to jobs with training and career ladders, and on providing avenues for the acquisition 
of skills. 
By some key accounts, this enforcement approach contributed significantly to improving 
the social and economic status of blacks in the late 1960s and early 1970s
46
 and to substantial 
progress in the desegregation of schools.
47
 However, I do not want to overstate the success or 
ambition of these public-private strategies
48
 or to ignore the possibility of even more 
transformative paths that might have been pursued particularly with regard to reform of labor 
institutions.
49
 What I propose is in the spirit of correcting how we often regard 
“antidiscrimination” today – a useful check on our modern tendency to characterize the 
antidiscrimination idea at the center of the Act as limited to a concern about individual bias, as 
too court-centered, insufficiently structural, or attenuated from core questions of access to 
opportunity. 
II. CLAIMING RELEVANCE  
Today, much of how commentators understand the relevance and capacity of 
antidiscrimination law is shaped by regimes of court enforcement and by Title VII litigation in 
particular. Title VII generates more litigation than any other portion of the Act. Title VII cases 
more frequently gain hearing at the Supreme Court than litigation involving other provisions of 
                                                 
46
 See John J. Donohue III & James Heckman, Continuous Versus Episodic Change: The Impact of Civil 
Rights Policy on the Economic Status of Blacks, 29 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1603, 1641 (1991) (providing 
evidence that enforcement of federal civil rights law, including Title VII, “was the major contributor to 
the sustained improvement in black economic status that began in 1965[]”); id. at 1637-38 (“[M]uch of 
the black improvement in the decade following enactment of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act came 
in the South”); id. (detailing the role of federal promotion of school integration and enforcement of Title 
VII). See also MACLEAN, supra note 37, at 80 (quoting labor organizers in the 1960s who credited federal 
executive order on nondiscrimination in government contractors with opening up positions for blacks in 
Southern textile mills); id. at 88 (detailing increased hiring of black workers by Southern textile workers 
and the contribution manufacturing employment made to the economic status of blacks in the South); 
Jonathan S. Leonard, The Impact of Affirmative Action Regulation & Equal Employment Law on Black 
Employment, 4 J. OF ECON. PERSP. 47 (1990). 
47
 In the area of education, key researchers have credited Title VI and its implementing guidelines with 
“provid[ing] the standard operating principles” that enabled key advances in school integration. GARY 
ORFIELD, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTHERN EDUCATION: THE SCHOOLS AND THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS 
ACT 101 (1969). 
48
 See, e.g., Paul Frymer, Acting When Elected Officials Won’t: Federal Courts and Civil Rights 
Enforcement in U.S Labor Unions 1935-85, 97 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 483, 483-99; Lieberman, supra note 
36 (providing account of the EEOC’s backlog in processing individual complaints in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s).  
49
 See RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS (2010). 
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the Act (or other civil rights statutes).
50
 And Title VII commands the greatest share of 
commentary about the Act in the legal academic literature. Title VII’s rise and prominence has 
coincided with a move away from the earlier more systemic or “structural” focus of the Act. For 
instance, while individual Title VII cases have continued to rise since the Act’s inception, pattern 
and practice and class-action litigation has fallen.
 51
 And, even as the overall volume of litigation 
has increased, litigation has shifted away from the hiring discrimination cases that prevailed in 
Title VII’s earlier years which sought to open up opportunity for previously excluded workers in 
economically salient industries, towards more individual claims of termination. This is a trend 
that researchers identified in the early 1990s before passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 
(which through damages and other mechanisms increased incentives to bring Title VII claims),
52
 
and that has continued in the subsequent years.
53
 Attorneys on the ground have noted the irony of 
this interplay between the Civil Rights Act of 1991’s strengthening of Title VII through a 
damage regime, and the decline of systemic reform litigation.
54
 Some of these changes in the 
shape of litigation no doubt reflect Title VII’s success in creating incentives for fairer 
                                                 
50
 For recent Title VII cases, see Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013) (requiring 
a showing of “but for” causation to recover for claims of retaliation); Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 
2434, 2439 (2013) (defining “supervisor” for the purposes of Title VII as one “empowered by the 
employer to take tangible employment actions against the victim”); Lewis v. City of Chicago, 560 U.S. 
205 (2010) (holding that a plaintiff who fails to file a timely charge when a disparate impact practice is 
adopted, may challenge the later application of that practice in a disparate impact suit); Ricci v. 
DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009) (holding that employers may take race-conscious steps to avoid disparate 
impact liability under the Act only where there is a “a strong basis in evidence” of such liability). 
51
 After 1991, the volume of charges filed with the EEOC involving Title VII claims of gender, race, 
national origin and religion discrimination increased over the prior years. See Sean Farhang, 
Congressional Mobilization of Private Litigants: Evidence from the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 6 J. EMP. 
LEGAL STUD. 1 (2009). Farhang’s data consists of charges with the EEOC, which though they are a 
precondition to court filing, do not in all cases lead to court filing. Since at least the 1980s, commentators 
have identified patterns of declining class action. See J. LeVonne Chambers & Barry Goldstein, Title VII 
at Twenty: The Continuing Challenge, 1 LAB. LAW. 235, 238 (1985).  
52
 See John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination 
Litigation, 43 STAN L. REV. 983, 1015-17 (1991) (while hiring cases dominated EEOC and court dockets 
in 1966, by 1985 wrongful termination charges significantly outnumbered hiring cases). 
53
 See Statute By Issue, FY 2010 – FY 2012, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, 
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/statutes_by_issue.cfm (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (EEOC 
charge data from Fiscal Years 2010, 2011, 2012 showing that discharge complaints outnumbered hiring 
complaints by 9 to 1). 
54
 As two legal services’ attorneys noted several years ago: “the volume of employment discrimination 
litigation has produced more aggressive gatekeeping by the courts, even as the lawsuits that offer the most 
hope for long term economic security for our clients — by opening jobs and pathways to advancement — 
become increasingly rare.” Sharon M. Dietrich & Noah Zatz, A Practical Legal Services Approach to 
Addressing Racial Discrimination in Employment, 36 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 39, 42 (2002). 
JOHNSON, LEVERAGING ANTIDISCRIMINATION 
DRAFT: PLEASE DO NOT CITE OR CIRCULATE WITHOUT PERMISSION. 
11 
 
employment practices and the provision’s salience.
55
 Still, with the individual Title VII case in 
mind, one might come to understand the Act as centered on individual bias; one might have 
reason to question the Act’s broader relevance to contemporary forces and patterns of exclusion. 
Yet, focusing on Title VII’s enforcement in individual cases pays insufficient heed to 
other provisions of the Act such as Title VI, which do not operate primarily in courts or as a tool 
for redress of individualized bias claims. In addition, emphasizing court enforcement in 
individual cases overlooks the broader regulatory tools of the Act – in both Title VI and Title 
VII—that can reach beyond ex post court enforcement in individual cases and that can operate to 
promote or encourage inclusion, and disrupt patterns of exclusion. 
To begin with Title VII, as the story of the 1964 Act’s early history shows, effective 
implementation of Title VII depended not just on litigation in individual cases but on use of a 
broad set of tools, including private class action and agency pattern and practice litigation, 
regulatory guidance, industry targeting, data analysis, and investigations. Furthermore, 
implementation of Title VII depended not just on narrow conceptions of discrimination centered 
on market bias or prejudice, but on the use of these hybrid enforcement tools to address a set of 
on-the-ground, evolving practices that inhibited opportunity for workers and to open up key 
institutions and industries. 
At the outset, it is worth noting even as Title VII litigation today is hobbled by significant 
doctrinal constraints,
56
 such litigation has continued capacity to address patterns of group 
exclusion, and reform organizational practices. Class actions, pattern and practice, and hiring 
cases may have declined relative to the early years of Title VII enforcement, but they are not 
extinct. In recent years, privately initiated Title VII litigation has sought to address exclusionary 
employment practices by public agencies that exclude minority workers,
57
 and practices such as 
steering and downward channeling that perpetuate occupational segregation in lower-skilled, 
                                                 
55
 See SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 29-31 (2010) (reviewing available empirical evidence and concluding that the threat of 
private enforcement litigation in particular regions led employers to adopt equal opportunity practices that 
improved the employment status of women and minorities). Laws, private enforcement, and regulatory 
action can also lead to the creation of rules and organizational structures within organizations to promote 
diversity and equal opportunity. See, e.g., John R. Sutton & Frank Dobbin, The Two Faces of 
Governance: Responses to Legal Uncertainty in U.S. Firms, 1955 to 1985, 61 AM. SOC. REV. 794 (1996); 
Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures: Organizational Mediation of Civil Rights 
Law, 97 AM. J. SOC. 1531 (1992). (At the same time, this literature also questions whether this 
organizational compliance leads to substantive change). 
56
 See Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 458, 467-68 (2001) (describing limitations of Title VII law in addressing contemporary, 
second generation discrimination which involves “patterns of interaction among groups within the 
workplace that, over time, exclude nondominant groups.”) 
57
 See, e.g., Lewis v. City of Chicago, 560 U.S. 205 (2010) (litigation successfully brought against the 
Chicago Fire Department for the use of written tests with a unjustified disparate impact on black 
applicants); U.S. v. City of New York, 717 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2013) (finding selection practices of the Fire 
Department of New York to have an unjustified disparate impact on Latino and black applicants).  
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 Litigation in this vein maintains relevance by taking aim at 
systemic practices and targeting pathways, training institutions like public employment and 
unions – a traditional focus of Title VII—as well the service sector in which large numbers of 
women and workers of color are employed (though often in the lowest ranks). 
Moreover, innovative litigation stems from important collaborations between 
antidiscrimination lawyers and groups that organize not around questions of discrimination but 
toward the goals of improving the condition of workers within particular industries. One group 
that has received some attention in the academic literature in recent years is the Restaurant 
Opportunities Center of New York (ROC-NY), which seeks to improve the working conditions 
and pay of restaurant workers in fine dining establishments in New York City. The group 
organizes restaurant workers to address wage and hour violations by employers and improve 
benefits like sick or parenting-related leave.
59
 Yet, central to the group’s mission is addressing 
what the group sees as pervasive discrimination and occupational segregation in the restaurant 
industry. Much as public and private implementers used the data collected by the EEOC to 
highlight the exclusion of black workers by Southern manufacturers, ROC-NY also publicizes 
practices in the restaurant industry that limit opportunity for women, immigrant workers, and 
workers of color.
60
 ROC-NY relies on audit testing — that classic tool of antidiscrimination 
enforcement used most extensively in the fair housing context
61
 — to document discrimination 
in hiring for particular restaurant positions.
62
 In addition, while the group’s strategies center on 
organizing and policy reform, ROC-NY partners with private attorneys to litigate discrimination 
                                                 
58
 See, e.g., Wright v. Stern, 553 F. Supp. 2d 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (settling claims of systemic 
discrimination against the New York City Park departments for racially segregated job assignments and 
discrimination in pay and promotion); Settlement Agreement and Joint Stipulation, Cogdell v. Wet Seal, 
Inc., No. SACV 12-01138 AG (C.D. Cal. June 11, 2013), ECF No. 78-1 (settling claims of systemic 
discrimination in hiring and promotion by large retailer).  
59
 See, e.g., REST. OPPORTUNITIES CTR. OF N.Y. UNITED & N.Y.C. REST. INDUS. COAL., THE THIRD 
SHIFT: CHILD CARE NEEDS AND ACCESS FOR WORKING MOTHERS IN RESTAURANTS (2013), 
http://rocny.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/ChildCare-Report-Final.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) 
[hereinafter THE THIRD SHIFT]. 
60
 See REST. OPPORTUNITIES CTR. OF N.Y. UNITED & N.Y.C. REST. INDUS. COAL., THE GREAT SERVICE 
DIVIDE: OCCUPATIONAL SEGREGATION AND INEQUALITY IN THE RESTAURANT INDUSTRY (2009) 
(reporting findings on discrimination in hiring, pay, promotion and training opportunities) [hereinafter 
THE GREAT SERVICE DIVIDE]. 
61
 Testers have been used most prominently to address housing discrimination and the Supreme Court has 
held that the Fair Housing Act provides standing for fair housing testers. See Havens Realty Corp. v. 
Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982) (holding that section 804(d) of the Fair Housing Act’s language making it 
illegal to “‘represent to any person . . . that any dwelling is not available for inspection, sale, or rental 
when such dwelling is in fact so available’” provides a sufficient basis for standing) (citation omitted).; 
Olatunde Johnson, The Last Plank: Rethinking Public and Private Power to Advance Fair Housing, 13 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 1191, 1198-99 (2011) (describing use of audit testing to document and address 
discrimination in housing). 
62
 Researcher Mark Bendick conducted the matched pair audits of 138 fine dining restaurants and found 
pervasive discrimination in hiring for server positions. See THE GREAT SERVICE DIVIDE, supra note 60, at 
2, 24. Specifically, the study found that testers of color were only 54 percent as likely as white testers to 
be offered server positions, and were less likely to receive a job interview. See id. at 54 (81.4% of white 
testers were granted an interview, compared to 60.5% for testers of color). White testers who received a 
job interview were more likely to be offered a job than testers of color. 
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cases, securing remedies in individual and group litigation. Significantly, ROC-NY leverages its 
investigations into discriminatory practices, its deep knowledge of the industry, its representation 
of workers, and its litigation successes to publicize exclusionary practices (such as the lack of 
formal and transparent practices for hiring, training and promotion), advocate for specific reform 




There is evidence too of revitalization of the type of public systemic enforcement that 
gave Title VII its salience in the early years of the Civil Rights Act. The EEOC has long been 
seen as a broken enforcement agency. Historically overtaxed and under resourced, the increase in 
Title VII and other employment discrimination cases in the 1990s created additional pressures on 
the EEOC since Title VII and most other employment claims must first be filed with the 
agency.
64
 And there are serious questions about whether the agency has adapted to accommodate 
this crush of complaints. Indeed, if the early EEOC sought to move away from the volume of 
individual complaints by focusing on systemic remedies and investigations, accounts of the 
EEOC in the 1990s and 2000s suggest an agency paralyzed by processing individual 
complaints.
65




But rather than wholly abandon the prospect of wresting more from this flawed public 
enforcement mechanism, it seems worth devoting creative attention to strategies for 
strengthening the regime. After all, the EEOC has formal tools and capacity unavailable to 
private litigants. Unlike private litigants, the EEOC can maintain systemic litigation without 
meeting the requirements of class action Rule 23
67
 (the difficulties in meeting the rule’s 
                                                 
63
 See id. (offering recommendations for industry changes); REST. OPPORTUNITIES CTR. OF N.Y. UNITED 
& N.Y.C. REST. INDUS. COAL., http://rocny.org/high-road-organizing/ (listing restaurants that take the 
“high road” by providing safe working conditions, complying with wage and hour law, and providing 
formal and transparent policies for employment opportunities and grievances). 
64
 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), (e), (f) (2006) (detailing the procedures for filing a Title VII charge with 
the EEOC and for bringing claims in court). 
65
 See Michael Selmi, The Value of the EEOC: Reexamining the Agency’s Role in Employment 
Discrimination Law, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 7-10, 21-22 (1996) (concluding that the agency has capacity to 
investigate only a few cases and in the end it determines that most claims have no merit). In the words of 
one commentator, the “EEOC has been forced to focus on handling charges instead of pursuing 
enforcement initiatives.” Michael Z. Green, Proposing a New Paradigm for EEOC Enforcement After 35 
Years: Outsourcing Charge Processing by Mandatory Mediation, 105 DICK L. REV. 305, 309-10 (2001). 
66
 See Leslie E. Silverman, Systemic Task Force Report to the Chair of the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission 4-5  available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/task_reports/upload/systemic.pdf.  
(listing deficiencies of current EEOC systems for tackling systemic discrimination) 
67
 See id. at 2 (noting that EEOC was well-positioned to tackle systemic discrimination because “ unlike 
private litigants, EEOC need not meet the stringent requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure in order to maintain a class suit in federal court”).. 
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requirements have hampered private class actions in recent years
68
). The EEOC can also pursue 
investigations without an actual complainant, by filing a commissioner’s charge.
69
 More, the 
EEOC can pursue conciliations, hold hearings to investigate patterns of discrimination, collect 
data, and issue regulatory guidance. 
To reverse its slide away from systemic litigation, the EEOC has recently announced a 
renewed focus on systemic discrimination, developing a plan for doing so after extensive 
consultation with experts and advocates.
70
 Indeed in the last three years, the EEOC has begun to 
bring more pattern and practice litigation; in 2012, it significantly increased its recoveries against 
employers in systemic discrimination cases over prior years.
71
 The EEOC has announced an 
increased emphasis on preventing employment discrimination through education and outreach, 
including by partnering with community groups to focus on the most disadvantaged workers and 
underserved communities.
72
 And, the EEOC has instituted important regulatory guidance on 
current barriers facing workers, notably revising its prior guidance on best practices in 
considering an applicant’s criminal history.
73
 
 I offer these examples not to deem them successes – success remains to be fully seen. 
The EEOC has had prominent setbacks in its recent systemic disparate impact litigation.
74
 
Further, the EEOC could utilize its existing powers more effectively. For instance, the EEOC 
might increase its ability to identify industries with discriminatory employment practices and to 
                                                 
68
 See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541 (2011) (holding 5-4 that plaintiffs lacked the 
“commonality” of factual and legal claims required to satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)); id. 
(holding unanimously that plaintiffs claims for back pay could not be certified pursuant to 23(b)(2)); see 
also Melissa Hart, Will Employment Discrimination Class Actions Survive?, 37 AKRON L. REV. 813, 820-
27 (2004) (describing pre-Wal-Mart lower courts’ constraints on use of 23(b)(2) certification – the 
traditional route for class certification in employment discrimination class actions – in cases involving 
compensatory and punitive damages). 
69
 See  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (outlining EEOC’s commissioner’s charges procedure). 
70
 See EEOC, STRATEGIC PLAN FOR FISCAL YEARS 2012-2016 (2012) (outlining renewed focused on 
systemic and pattern and practice litigation), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/upload/sep.pdf.  
71
Id. (noting four fold increase in the amount of damages recovered from employers in systemic 
discrimination cases between FY 2012 and FY 2011). See EEOC, STRATEGIC PLAN FOR FISCAL YEARS 
2007-2012 (2006) available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/upload/strategic_plan_07to12_mod.pdf. 
72
 See EEOC, supra note 69; EEOC, Performance and Accountability Report: FY 2012, available at 
www.Eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/2012par_performance.cfm (last visited Feb. 3, 2014). 
73
 See EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE NO. 915.002, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON THE 
CONSIDERATION OF ARREST AND CONVICTION RECORDS IN EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER TITLE VII 
OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1963 (2012), available at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/upload/arrest_conviction.pdf (issuing guidance on how employers 
might avoid disparate impact discrimination in the consideration of arrest and conviction records in 
employment decisions). 
74
 See EEOC v. Kaplan Higher Education Corp., No. 01:10 CV 2882, 2013 WL 322116 (N.D. Ohio, Jan. 
28, 2013) (dismissing EEOC’s suit against an employer for screening applicants based on credit histories, 
holding that expert’s evidence of disparate impact was inadmissible); EEOC v. Freeman, No. RWT-09-
CV-2573, 2013 WL 4464553 (D. Md. Aug. 9, 2013) (granting summary judgment to employer in case 
involving claims of discriminatory impact of criminal and credit history background checks on minority 
applicants, holding that expert testimony was unreliable and that disparate impact was not caused by a 
specific employment practice). 
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analyze the EEO-1 and other data that it collects on private employers.
75
 EEOC could use data to 
hold hearings on problematic industry practices, disseminate information and best practices, 
generate regulatory guidance, and pursue litigation. Another tool that the EEOC might deploy, 
perhaps in conjunction with nongovernmental organizations and nonprofits, is the use of audit 
studies to identify hiring discrimination. While courts are not settled on the ability of 
employment testers to recover damages and injunctive relief,
76
 the results of audit studies might 
still prove useful for conducting investigations and for providing insight into industry practices.
77
 
But the agency’s current emphasis recaptures the focus on systemic discrimination – it attunes us 
to the possibilities that might still remain in a Title VII that moves beyond a focus on individual 
litigation. 
The other key provision of the Act — Title VI— has also served as an important location 
in recent years for addressing contemporary problems of exclusion. Title VI differs from Title 
VII in that its central enforcement target is not private industry but federal agencies and grantees. 
Its key mode of enforcement is not litigation but administrative regulation, backed by the threat 
of funding withdrawal. In recent years, regulatory enforcement of Title VI has yielded an 
                                                 
75
 See Alfred W. Blumrosen, Intentional Job Discrimination in Metropolitan America 4 (2002) 
(unpublished paper) (on file with author) (describing the EEOC’s failure to make consistent use of EEO-1 
data over the period stemming from 1965 through late 1990s). Even when the EEOC has displayed the 
political will to utilize this data, it has not been able to make good use of this data because it lacked 
internal resources (staff and technological systems) for adequate data analysis. See STAINBACK & 
TOMASKOVIC-DEVEY, supra note 4. Also, the EEOC has failed to organize collect, organize and tabulate 
the data in effective ways. See EEOC, SYSTEMATIC TASK FORCE REPORT (2006), n.37, available at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/task_reports/upload/systemic.pdf (recommending that EEOC organize data to 
allow for automatic generation of reports on firms and their subsidiaries and comparative analysis 
between firms within an industry or relevant labor market). 
76
 The Supreme Court has not ruled on the question of whether Title VII grants standing for employment 
testers (Title VII has different language from the FHA) and lower courts are split on the question. 
Compare Fair Employment Council of Greater Wash., Inc. v. BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d 1268 (D.C. Cir. 
1994) (finding that employment testers lacked standing to sue because they did not actually intend to form 
an employment contract with the employer, though allowing organizational standing for group that 
sponsored the testers) with Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Servs., Inc., 222 F.3d 289, 297 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(finding that employment testers had standing to sue under Title VII, reasoning that FHA and Title VII 
both take “broad aim at discrimination in their respective sectors and in that sense are the functional 
equivalents of one another”). In regulatory guidance, the EEOC has taken the position that testers can file 
charges and litigate claims of employment discrimination. See EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE NO. 
915.002, WHETHER “TESTERS” CAN FILE CHARGES AND LITIGATE CLAIMS OF EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION (1996), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/testers.html. 
77
 The EEOC has in recent years indicated that it will “explore the use of matched-pair testing,” see 
Eradicating Racism & Colorism from Employment, EEOC www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/initiatives/e-
race/index.cfm (last visited Feb. 3, 2014),, but currently operates no testing program. The EEOC has tried 
to initiate matched-pair testing over the past several decades but has abandoned the project in the face of 
opposition from some members of Congress. See Michael Yelnosky, Testers Revisited (Roger Williams 
Law Sch. Legal Stud. Working Paper, Research Paper No. 74, 2009) (describing how in 1998 Congress 
conditioned a budgetary increase for the EEOC on the agency’s abandoning its request for funding for 
testers). The EEOC has directed funding to private groups to conduct such testing. See id. at 5 (noting that 
after Congress blocked EEOC’s testing program, the agency provided $200,000 to private groups to carry 
out a testing program). 
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important array of regulations that place affirmative requirements of inclusion on grantees. 
Implementing Title VI, the Department of Agriculture requires federal agencies administering 
agriculture, forestry, food, and nutrition programs to undertake ongoing analyses to ensure that 
minorities benefit from these federally funded programs.
78
 Federally funded public transit and 
highway programs must take affirmative steps to assess the impacts of their programs on 
minorities and persons with limited English proficiency, adopt mitigating alternatives, and must 
include minority groups in their planning.
79
 In an account of these directives in mass transit, I 
showed how they required grantees to incorporate impact assessments in their planning, engage 




These Title VI directives bear on the debate about the relevance of discrimination law 
today: they extend beyond individual bias, and their implementation depends not on ex post 
enforcement by courts (although litigation may sometimes play a role in enforcement) but on 
implementation by regulated actors. In addition, these directives intervene in regulatory domains 
that are linchpins for determining inclusion and opportunity distribution today. For instance, 
mass transportation policy and design has strong effects on economic mobility — high minority 
and poor communities are often disconnected from important job centers — and access to 
transportation is a key determinant of the distribution of resources and patterns of racial 
segregation and concentrated poverty across a metropolitan region.
81
 By encouraging inclusion 
of the needs of minority communities in design decisions, promoting ongoing equity assessments 
and mitigation, Title VI mass transit directives seek to interrupt the reproduction of existing, 
unequal patterns of transportation access and the attendant spatial inequalities. In addition, as in 
the employment example described above, these Title VI directives are harnessed by groups that 
do not centrally organize around questions of antidiscrimination – but who instead organize their 
                                                 
78
 See OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., DR 4300-4, CIVIL RIGHTS IMPACT ANALYSIS 1 
(2003), available at http://www.ocio.usda.gov/directives/doc/DR4300-4.pdf (requiring that agency 
grantees conduct a “civil rights impact analysis”). 
79
 See 49 C.F.R. pt. 21 (2011) (imposing duties of nondiscrimination, assessment of impacts, and 
inclusion on federal grantees). FED. TRANSIT ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., CIRCULAR FTA C 
4702.1A, TITLE VI AND TITLE VI-DEPENDENT GUIDELINES FOR FEDERAL TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION 
RECIPIENTS 11-1 (2007) (listing goals of regulation as preventing disparities, promoting participation, and 
ensuring access to transportation by all groups); FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., NO. 
6640.23A, FHWA ACTIONS TO ADDRESS ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN MINORITY POPULATIONS AND 
LOW-INCOME POPULATIONS (June 14, 2012), available at 
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/legsregs/directives/orders/6640_23.htm.  
80
 Olatunde C. A. Johnson, Beyond the Private Attorney General: Equality Directives in American Law, 
87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1339, 1384-86 (2012). 
81
 See, e.g., Thomas W. Sanchez, The Impact of Public Transportation on U.S. Metropolitan Wage 
Inequality, 39 URB. STUD. 423, 434 (2002) (showing links between the availability of public 
transportation and wage inequality in large metropolitan areas). The effect of transportation on 
segregation is well-documented. See generally KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE 
SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES (1985) (detailing the contribution of highway development to 
suburbanization, sprawl and racial segregation). 
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advocacy around the problems of particular geographic communities or on a specific policy 
problem (such as transit equity).
82
 
Perhaps even more than Title VII, Title VI makes plain the risk of leaving the Act behind 
as reformers focus on questions of mobility, opportunity and spatial equality. Because Title VI 
commands attention to race and ethnicity in a vast number of federal programs involving billions 
of dollars, its regulatory infrastructure is too powerful not to employ as a tool for advancing 
reform. 
III. ANTIDISCRIMINATION’S PLACE 
As a way of defining a problem, and as a legal intervention, antidiscrimination is no 
doubt less central than it once was. In education, discriminatory discipline, racialized tracking, 
and discriminatory student assignment policies may remain problems, but reformers’ attention is 
understandably attuned to addressing disparities through reforms to improve the quality of 
educational interventions. In employment, important concerns about discrimination and 
occupational segregation in labor markets might be overtaken by the fate of workers in an 
economy that leaves little room for less skilled and semi-skilled workers.
83
 Those interested in 
inclusion and particularly in reducing racial and ethnic disparities would be gravely wrong to 
frame their claims solely in terms of discrimination (whether a thin or robust account) without 
engaging a broader set of reform strategies. 
Still, the Civil Rights Act has important role to play in these domains. Understanding the 
Act’s place requires recovering the Act’s central ambition as well as – to use the buzz word of 
the moment – innovating to make the Act responsive to contemporary problems. Some may 
argue that the Act in its current formulation is not worth such sustained attention. After all, much 
innovation might be accomplished through new regulation, new statutes at the federal, state and 
local level. Such innovation is reflected in statutes requiring targeted attention to the progress of 
racial and ethnic minorities in education
84
 or by requirements that state actors address racial 
disparities in their juvenile justice systems.
85
 Innovation is evident too in efforts to intervene to 
address practices that may have a particular impact on minority or women but that address the 
declining fates of all lower-wage workers such as skills training, the expansion of school-to-work 
and apprenticeship programs, wage reform, reentry programs, the creation of new collective 
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bargaining regimes for low-wage workers,
86
 child care and sick leave policy
87
 or reform of the 
inappropriate uses of employment background checks. 
88
 
 The reasons for continuing nevertheless to ask how the Civil Rights Act can bear on 
contemporary questions are both pragmatic and expressive. The pragmatic argument is that it is 
hard to make progress on inequality without attention to questions of how status — race, 
ethnicity and gender — structure opportunity in distinct ways. The Civil Rights Act contains one 
of the few places in American law that directs attention to these categories, and that provides 
mechanisms for disrupting long-standing patterns of exclusion. More, it provides an expansive, if 
imperfect, public and private regulatory infrastructure for advancing these goals. The second 
perhaps more expressive reason is that the Act was never simply about antidiscrimination in the 
narrowest sense. Even if so conceived by some of its drafters, it has absorbed a meaning through 
implementation and cultural salience that gestures towards broader claims of citizenship and 
inclusion. 
CONCLUSION 
As the Civil Rights Act of 1964 turns fifty, I am sympathetic to the idea that we should 
demote discrimination. Recognizing this, social reformers increasingly organize their equality 
claims around questions of opportunity, economic mobility, and diminishing disparities based on 
geography and place. Yet, the meaning of the 1964 Civil Rights Act is not limited to narrow 
notions of discrimination; it still has a role to play in structuring claims and advancing reforms in 
these new domains. As reformers design new strategies, the Act’s initial structural reform 
ambitions are worth remembering. 
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